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WHY NONRESIDENT PLAINTIFFS CAN
CONTEST PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
UNRELATED COUNTERSUITS
JON D. BRESSLER*
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that fairness is the guiding
principle in determining whether, by his activities, a defendant has submitted
to personal jurisdiction in a particular forum. However, this question has
never been explicitly addressed with respect to unrelated counterclaims a
defendant may bring against a plaintiff where the plaintiffs only connection
to the forum is his litigation with the defendant. While some have concluded
that it would be fair to automatically subject a plaintiff to jurisdiction in the
forum in which he chooses to sue, that conclusion is at odds with the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and modem understandings of
fair play. This Comment, therefore, argues that an original nonresident
plaintiff should have the right to contest personal jurisdiction when a
defendant brings an unrelated counterclaim against him.
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INTRODUCTION
As any first-year law student knows, federal and state courts lack
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who does not live within the
court's state unless the plaintiffs lawsuit relates to the defendant's
ties to that state. Yet under current doctrine, courts generally
assume that if a plaintiff brings an action against a defendant, that
plaintiff is then subject to a defendant's counterclaim for any
matter, regardless of whether there is a connection between the
counterclaim and the plaintiffs activities in the state. Indeed, some
courts, practitioners, and scholars have maintained that the U.S.
Supreme Court reached this conclusion in its 1938 decision Adam v.
Saenger.1 In fact, the counterclaim in Saenger was closely related to
the plaintiffs claim, and thus did not directly raise the question. In
any case, this view is at odds with the principles of fairness and
justice that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2
requires, as articulated in the Court's decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington' in 1945. International Shoe established our
modern understanding of the constitutional underpinnings of
personal jurisdiction, and it is time for courts to acknowledge that a
broad reading of Saenger controverts that understanding.
Personal jurisdiction is a highly complex and often nebulous area
of judge-made legal doctrine and one that has routinely emphasized
1. 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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fairness as a central tenet of its theoretical underpinnings. This
Comment argues that an original nonresident plaintiff has the right
to contest personal jurisdiction when a defendant brings an
unrelated counterclaim against him. The Supreme Court has only
ruled that an original plaintiff facing a compuory counterclaim,
which is a claim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as
the original claim, is subject to the jurisdiction of the forum where
the original suit was brought.' The Court has never explicitly stated
that the same logic applies to other counterclaims that lack a nexus
to the original cause of action. Thus, the view embracing the
submission doctrine enumerated in Saenger, which states that a
plaintiff is subject to the jurisdiction of the court for all possible
issues that arise between the parties,' rests on a false premise.
Moreover, because an original plaintiff facing an unrelated
counterclaim is in nearly the same position as an original defendant,
he should have the right to contest jurisdiction as though the
counterclaim was being considered separately from his initial
litigation. Accordingly, courts should reject the view that a plaintiff
implicitly or constructively submits to defend any countersuit after he
commences an action of his own.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of personal
jurisdiction precedent. It then briefly highlights the rights of
defendants with respect to civil procedure, examines the origins of
the submission doctrine, and describes the doctrine's place within a
modern understanding of jurisdiction based on fair play and
substantial justice. Part II begins with a hypothetical situation
illustrating the unique dilemma encountered by plaintiffs facing
4. See Saenger, 303 U.S. at 67-68 (holding that it was fair for a state court to
assume personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff for any counterclaims when the plaintiff
voluntarily made use of the court's services in bringing the original suit against the
defendant). The counterclaim in Saenger was compulsory because the issues were
related. See id. at 65 n.1 (citing the relevant California law, which governed related
counterclaims); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (defining a compulsory counterclaim as a claim that
"arises out of the same transaction or occurrence [as] the opposing party's claim").
5. Saenger, 303 U.S. at 67-68 ("The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in
demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for
all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence."). The use of
the word "submission" in this Comment necessarily subsumes what has been
traditionally defined as "consent," "presence," and "purposeful availment," as each of
these doctrines relate to submission to jurisdiction as pronounced in Saenger
Regardless of which label is applied to the rationale, as applied herein, fundamental
fairness is equally applicable.
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unrelated counterclaims in forums with which they have no other ties
or connections. It argues that because a plaintiff facing an unrelated
counterclaim and a defendant are similarly situated, they should be
treated similarly for purposes of contesting personal jurisdiction.
Part II then analyzes landmark personal jurisdiction cases and applies
their logic and reasoning to the hypothetical situation. This
Comment concludes that in light of both recent and historical
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the most equitable approach is
to forego efficiency in the name of fairness so that a plaintiff
maintains the right to contest personal jurisdiction when a defendant
brings an unrelated counterclaim against him.
I. BACKGROUND
This Comment's primary argument is based on two interrelated
jurisprudential narratives. Part A provides an overview of the history
of personal jurisdiction theory from its inception to its current usage,
and Part B details the submission doctrine as presently understood
within the other bases for personal jurisdiction, including minimum
contacts and fair play.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: From Presence to the Present
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to exercise its authority over
certain persons or things.' Personal jurisdiction, or in personam
jurisdiction, is the power of a court to decide cases and enter
judgments against a particular person or business entity.' To this
end, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to determine when a court can require a
nonresident defendant to appear and defend himself.
In 1877, the Supreme Court developed the first traditional
conception of jurisdiction in a case involving an out-of-state
defendant who owned property in the state where the plaintiff
brought suit. The Court reasoned that a defendant's physical
presence-when accompanied by a valid service of process-was a
6. jurisdiction, BLACK'S LAW DICHONARY (10th ed. 2014).
7. See Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (stating that
personal jurisdiction entails jurisdiction over a person's rights rather than property
interests). General jurisdiction refers to a court's power to enter a judgment against
a defendant for any cause of action, due to the defendant's systematic and
continuous contacts with a state; specific jurisdiction requires a nexus between the
cause of action and the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id.
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legitimate basis for in personam jurisdiction.! Moreover, the Court
established that attachment of a nonresident's property within a state
created in rem jurisdiction over the property and could be used to
compel a defendant to appear.9
The second traditional basis for jurisdiction is implied consent.
States can enact processes whereby nonresidents implicitly consent to
authorizing a state official as an agent for service of process in suits
arising from events that occurred in the state. For instance,
nonresident motorists must submit to another state's jurisdiction
when a plaintiffs suit arises from a collision or accident with that
nonresident on the state's roads.'o The third and final traditional
basis is that a plaintiff may always invoke general personal jurisdiction
in a state where a defendant is domiciled or, for a business, has its
principal place of business or place of incorporation."
Although each of these three traditional bases for personal
jurisdiction are important, the modern standard set forth in
International Shoe is most relevant to this discussion. There, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to mean that
personal jurisdiction could be established through a defendant's
minimum contacts with a state, such that maintenance of a suit would
"not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"2
The Court decided that a company headquartered in St. Louis,
Missouri conducted "systematic and continuous" business in
Washington, which established sufficient contacts and rendered it fair
to subject the company to the jurisdiction of a Washington court for a
case related to those business activities.13
Modern personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved as these
standards of minimum contacts, substantial justice, and fair play have
been interpreted in various ways. In Shaffer v. Heitner,4 the plaintiff
held one share of stock in a Delaware corporation and filed a
derivative action in Delaware state court against the corporation's
officers." With his complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion to
8. Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1877).
9. Id.
10. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); see also infra notes 40-65 and
accompanying text (illustrating several cases involving implied jurisdictional consent).
11. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
12. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken, 311
U.S. at 463).
13. Id. at 320.
14. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15. Id. at 189-90.
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sequester the officers' stock-which the lower court said was
physically located in Delaware-even though none of the officers
were residents of Delaware and their stock did not relate to the
underlying cause of action." The Court held that strict "presence"
jurisdiction was no longer fair and that a defendant's property had to
relate to the plaintiffs cause of action before it could be attached to
the lawsuit." Further, the Court found that the defendants "simply
had nothing to do with the State of Delaware" because being an
officer and holding stock did not establish minimum contacts and,
therefore, did not automatically confer jurisdiction under Delaware
statute." The "constitutional limitation on state power"" imposed in
this case-that even traditional means of establishing personal
jurisdiction must be fair-is the cornerstone for every important
personal jurisdiction decision to date.
In certain instances, the fairness equation encompasses the
concept of foreseeability. The general rule is that a defendant's
ability to foresee being haled into court is insufficient on its own2o
otherwise, every item that an individual or vendor sold would carry
the possibility of suit wherever it went-an unfair result.' The Court
established several factors to consider in determining whether
exercising personal jurisdiction, or forcing a person to defend
himself in a particular forum, is fair: (1) the burden on the
defendant, (2) the interest of the forum state, (3) the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining relief, (4) the interest of the interstate judicial
system in obtaining efficient resolutions, and (5) the shared interest
of states in furthering social policies.22
Three years after citing these fairness factors, the Court issued a
fragmented decision in Burnham v. Superior Court23 where no opinion
commanded a majority. Two opinions have nevertheless become
part of the personal jurisdiction canon and remain good law. Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion reiterated the "firmly established
16. Id. at 190-92.
17. Id. at 213, 215.
18. Id. at 216.
19. Id. at 216-17.
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980)
(stating that the foreseeability relevant to due process is "that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there").
21. Id. at 296.
22. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
23. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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principle[]" that physical presence in a state is enough to establish
personal jurisdiction, seemingly counter to the Court's opinion in
Shaffer, the opinion emphasized traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.24 However, Justice Scalia did admit exceptions to
that rule, including fraud, kidnapping, and being tricked into
entering the state." A nonresident's participation in litigation
proceedings is another historical personal jurisdiction exception to
which most courts have adhered.26
Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice Scalia's rationale for finding
jurisdiction, arguing in his concurrence that, even if a person is
physically present in a state and served with process there, a court
must still determine whether it is fair to subject that person to
jurisdiction." However, he based his reasoning on a theory of
purposeful availment rather than minimum contacts, finding that a
defendant's voluntary presence in a state-given that he would be
taking advantage of the benefits and protections of that state's laws
and that technology has made it increasingly easy to litigate in
foreign jurisdictions-satisfies due process concerns.8
In 2014, the Court issued two decisions that further clarified the
scope of both general and specific personal jurisdiction. Walden v.
Fiore` reaffirmed that, when evaluating a defendant's minimum
contacts, the relationship between the defendant and the forum state
must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself created with the
forum state.so This maintains the focus of the minimum contacts
analysis squarely on the relationship between those contacts and the
court's exercise of specific jurisdiction.' Daimler AG v. Bauman," on
24. See id. at 610-11, 613-14, 619 (plurality opinion) ("Particularly striking is the
fact that ... not one American case from the period (or, for that matter, not one
American case until 1978) held, or even suggested, that in-state personal service on
an individual was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.").
25. See id. at 613 (listing fraud, force, and being a witness in an unrelated suit as a
few of the traditional exceptions).
26. See, e.g., Diamond v. Earle, 105 N.E. 363, 363 (Mass. 1914) (ruling that
nonresident witnesses are exempt from service of process); see also Valley Bank &
Trust Co. v. Marrewa, 237 N.E.2d 677, 678-79 (Mass. 1968) (reaffirming Diamond).
27. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629-30 (Brennan, J., concurring) (contending that
Justice Scalia's reasoning had been preempted by the Court's decisions in
International Shoe and Shaffer).
28. Id. at 637-39.
29. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
30. Id. at 1122.
31. See id. at 1121 (indicating that a State's exercise of specific jurisdiction only
comports with due process if "the defendant's suit-related conduct... create[s] a
substantial connection with the forum State" (emphasis added)).
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the other hand, dealt with general jurisdiction and, in recognizing
the reduced role that general jurisdiction has played in recent years,"
limited its scope." The Court found that Daimler was not "at home"
in California and that its activity was not "so constant and pervasive"
that it could reasonably be sued there.5 Even if it was constant and
pervasive, the Court reasoned, the concept of general jurisdiction
should be limited to one easily identifiable place." A formula that
granted general jurisdiction over companies merely because they had
"engage [d] in [a] substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business" would be "unacceptably grasping" if it applied over a
multitude of states."
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor endorsed a broad "fair and
reasonable" test for general jurisdiction that would subject large
companies with substantial business operations in many states to
general jurisdiction in all of those states." In her view, this expansion
of general jurisdiction would not be unfair, considering that those
companies had extensive contacts in those states."
In sum, although jurisdiction based on purposeful availment is
appropriate in certain situations, the main tenets of specific
jurisdiction nevertheless provide limits to a defendant's ultimate
submission by requiring a nexus between the plaintiffs complaint
and the defendant's minimum contacts with a forum. Thus, with the
exception of Burnham, the Court's stance seems to be evolving toward
limiting jurisdiction where a cause of action has no relationship to
the out-of-state defendant's contacts with the forum.
Part II of this Comment, consequently, will focus on the
application of this principle to the question of whether mandating a
plaintiffs submission to personal jurisdiction for unconnected
counterclaims is constitutionally sound. First, however, a brief
32. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
33. See id. at 757-58 (acknowledging that specific jurisdiction questions had been
far more frequent and that "general jurisdiction [had] come to occupy a less
dominant place in the contemporary scheme").
34. See id. at 758-60 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's application of the agency
theory, which would have greatly expanded the reach of general jurisdiction over foreign
entities by attributing a domestic subsidiary's contacts to its foreign parent company).
35. Id. at 751.
36. Id. at 760.
37. Id. at 760-61.
38. Id. at 770-71 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 771, 773 (criticizing the majority's view for placing less risk of harm
on large corporations and more risk on individuals wishing to bring suit).
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discussion of a defendant's rights with respect to contesting and
submitting to jurisdiction is necessary.
B. Contesting Personal Juisdiction and the Submission Doctine
A defendant ordinarily has the right to contest personal
jurisdiction as an affirmative defense in lawsuits brought against him,
either by motion or in a responsive pleading.0 However, a defendant
waives that right by failing to timely raise the defense,' and, unlike
subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot review a waiver of the
defense sua sponte."
Several situations illustrate the bounds of a defendant's ability to
contest a plaintiffs invocation of a court's jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has unequivocally ruled that personal jurisdiction is a legal
right intended to protect the individual, but the actions of an
individual may amount to submission to suit whether voluntary or
not." Thus, by presenting additional claims against a plaintiff after
litigation has already begun, a defendant subjects himself to all of the
consequences of his appearance relating to those claims."4 However,
even when a defendant files an unrelated counterclaim with his
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (2).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
42. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,704 (1982).
43. See id. at 703-05 (holding that a plethora of legal arrangements and actions
can indicate express or implied consent to personal jurisdiction, including contracts,
stipulations, and arbitration agreements); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal,
and Substantive Due Process: PersonalJurisdiction a d Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L.
REv. 479, 517-18 & n.229 (1987) (asserting that, based on Adam v. Saenger, plaintiffs
may be forced to defend even unrelated counterclaims).
44. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 241 (1935) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 435 (1932)). In this case, the district court
ordered a holding company to be dissolved and appointed receivers to collect and
disburse its assets to shareholders. Id. at 230. Individuals who were formerly
directors and officers of a coal company in which the holding company owned stock
brought claims against those receivers. Id. at 231-35. When the receivers brought
counterclaims against the officers for mismanagement and misuse of assets, the
officers specially appeared to contest personal jurisdiction because they lived in a
different state. Id. at 235-37.
45. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, counterclaims are either
compulsory or permissive; compulsory claims generally arise from the same subject
matter-the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences-
of the original claims, and permissive claims do not. FED. R. CIv. P. 13. Some states,
like California, have similar distinctions; others, like New York, make no distinctions
or mandatory designations about the nexus between the claim and the counterclaim.
Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 428.10 (West Supp. 2015) (differentiating between
related and unrelated causes of action against the party who filed the complaint),
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motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,46 merely filing that
claim does not constitute a forfeiture of his right to contest personal
jurisdiction, provided that the defense is otherwise properly presented.
This Comment focuses on whether the submission doctrine in the
context of permissive counterclaims-that is, counterclaims that do
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the basis
for the plaintiffs claims-can be considered constitutionally fair. In
addition to Hess v. Pawloski,48 several historical cases regarding
implicit submission and its applicability in state laws granting
jurisdiction over specific issues are particularly relevant. General
commercial litigation and patent infringement suits between
technology companies are among the types of cases where the issue
of implied submission most frequently arises.
In 1931, the Supreme Court considered in Frank L. Young Co. v.
McNeal-Edwards Co.49 a Massachusetts tate law that allowed its courts
to automatically acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
plaintiff for counterclaims that a defendant brought against it."o The
plaintiff-a Massachusetts company that bought oil drums from the
with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019 (McKinney Supp. 2015) (providing no distinction between
related and unrelated claims). Part II of this Comment focuses on the constitutional
nexus requirement and is, therefore, applicable in all jurisdictions, regardless of
whether the procedural scheme is set up as compulsory and permissive, or no such
distinction is made. For the sake of consistency with the language of certain cases,
this Comment treats as functionally equivalent the terms compulsory and related,
and permissive and unrelated, when describing counterclaims.
46. Every state has a procedure in place allowing defendants to contest personal
jurisdiction. Under the Federal system, the applicable rule is Rule 12(b) (2). FED. R.
Civ. P. 12 (b) (2).
47. See Rates Tech. Inc. v. Nortel Networks Corp., 399 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (declaring the rule, that filing either type of counterclaim does not waive
the right to object to personal jurisdiction, to be valid); Bayou Steel Corp. v. M/V
Amstelvoorn, 809 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1987) (adopting the rule and characterizing it
as the majority view). But see Textile Tech. Exch., Inc. v. Davis, 611 N.E.2d 768, 769 (N.Y.
1993) (holding that a defendant waives his right to contestjurisdiction when he brings a
counterclaim unrelated to the plaintiffs initial cause of action).
48. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
49. 283 U.S. 398 (1931).
50. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 227, § 2 (2015) (stating that nonresident plaintiffs
"shall be held to answer any counterclaim brought against him by the defendant or
defendants" in the original action even if the plaintiff could not be served with
adequate process). At the time, Massachusetts's law, as quoted by the Supreme
Court, had a qualification that the defendant's demands in the counterclaim were
"of such a nature that the judgment or execution in the one case may be set off
against the judgment or execution in the other." Frank L. Young Co., 283 U.S. at 399.
This previous iteration of the law confirms that the two matters had to relate to the
same transaction or occurrence.
650 [Vol. 65:641
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defendant, a Virginia company-sued for breach of warranty.51
Later, the Virginia company sued the Massachusetts company for
conversion of the drums when it failed to return them pursuant to
their agreement.52 The Massachusetts company then commenced a
second suit against the Virginia company for the same cause of action
as before.5 ' The Court held that the Massachusetts law applied to federal
district court proceedings such that the nonresident Virginia company
could not contest personal jurisdiction." However, because the
counterclaim arose out of the same contract as the original claim, the
Court limited its holding to apply only to compulsory counterclaims.
A year after Frank L. Young Co., the plaintiff in Leman v. Krentler-
Arnold Hinge Last Co.,56 which lost on a defendant's compulsory
counterclaim, was charged with civil contempt for violating an
injunction imposed by the prior suit." The Supreme Court held that
by initially bringing suit, the plaintiff submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court for "all issues embraced in the suit," which
included the defendant's counterclaim, because traditionally states
had the power to bind plaintiffs on subsequent orders.
Therefore, when a defendant brings counterclaims closely related
to the original cause of action and seeks equitable remedies against a
plaintiffs infringement, the plaintiff is generally subject to the
jurisdiction of the court in which he brought the initial claim.
Accordingly, in affirming Leman, the Court in General Electric Co. v.
Marvel Rare Metals Co.5 1 made an important distinction between a
plaintiff who hales someone into court and a defendant who asserts a
51. Frank L. Young Co., 283 U.S. at 399.
52. Id.
53. See id. (explaining that the first lawsuit failed because the attachment of the
drums to the suit was the limit of the court's jurisdiction).
54. See id. at 399-400 ("Giving the counterclaim the formality of a separate suit
hardly is a sufficient reason for refusing to apply the local policy and law.").
55. Id. at 400.
56. 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
57. Id. at 449-51. The plaintiff-respondent sued the defendant for patent
infringement, and the defendant countersued the plaintiff for the same. Id. at 450.
The defendant won both suits, and the lower court enjoined the plaintiff from
making, selling, and using the defendant's patented materials. Id. The plaintiff then
created a "new" product, and the defendant brought an action claiming that the
plaintiff was in civil contempt of court for violating the injunction. Id. The plaintiff
contested the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in the new suit. Id.
58. See id. at 451-52 (asserting that "[t]he decree upon the counterclaim bound
the [plaintiff] personally," and that it applied everywhere "continuously and perpetually"
in the United States, notjust in the jurisdiction where the case was heard).
59. 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
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counterclaim in a court of the plaintiffs choosing."o This distinction
seems to indicate that a plaintiff who chooses the forum has fewer
rights than a defendant who did not. Even so, the rule of submitting
to jurisdiction applies to all issues of the case, including injunctions
granted to successful counterclaiming defendants in patent
infringement litigation."
In 1938, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed that, based on state
statutes and an interpretation of the Due Process Clause, plaintiffs
automatically submitted to personal jurisdiction for counterclaims
brought against them. The Court in Saenger upheld a state's power to
hear a counterclaim against the plaintiff even though he claimed a
lack of sufficient contacts between that forum and the defendant's
counterclaim." The California statute authorizing counterclaims
referred to claims that "relat[ed] to or depend[ed] upon the
contract, transaction, matter, happening or accident upon which the
action is brought."" Therefore, even though the Court found that
"[t] here is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state
from adopting a procedure" automatically allowing for jurisdiction
over such compulsory counterclaims, the Court never overtly ruled
on counterclaims unrelated to the original action.' The opinion
concluded with this statement:
The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from
the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being
there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his
presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the condition of
opening its courts to the plaintiff.'
Some legal scholars and practitioners have interpreted this case-
by way of this quote in particular-as applicable to related and
unrelated counterclaims alike." At least two New York courts have
held this view, relying on the state's liberal counterclaim rule," albeit
60. Id. at 431, 435. The defendant, responding to a patent infringement claim,
brought a counterclaim alleging patent infringement against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of personal jurisdiction because
it did not provide any legitimate jurisdictional basis for the suit.
61. Id. at 435.
62. 303 U.S. 59, 61-62 (1938).
63. Id. at 65 n.1.
64. See id. at 67.
65. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
66. See infra Part II (providing an analysis of unrelated counterclaims).
67. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 303 (McKinney Supp. 2015).
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in dicta.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
distinguishing an intervening defendant from original defendants,
has also ruled that it would be fair for a plaintiff to "surrender . .. his
privilege to be sued elsewhere" in counterclaims by the original
defendant. " This interpretation is flawed and produces an
unconstitutional mandate with respect to unrelated claims.
Florida state courts have endorsed a view contrary to this popular
reading of Saenger. In 1939, the year after the Supreme Court
decided Saenger, the Florida Supreme Court embraced the idea that a
court only has automatic personal jurisdiction over counterclaims
against the plaintiff that are related to the original claim.70 In
essence, submission to a court's jurisdiction is only implied for
counterclaims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence of
the original suit." Relying on this reasoning, Florida district courts of
appeal have consistently held that finding automatic jurisdiction for
anything other than related counterclaims would violate due
process." A federal district court in Pennsylvania has also taken this
view with respect to defendants who have previously litigated in a
state. Merely because a person defended a suit before, the court
68. See Evergreen Sys., Inc. v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that a defendant may file a counterclaim containing any
assertion against the plaintiff); Rockwood Nat'l Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 406 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (App. Div. 1978) (implying that a state court may read the
New York statute to cover permissive counterclaims).
69. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman, Inc., 75 F.2d 472, 472-73 (2d Cir.
1935), af'd sub nom. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935).
70. Glass v. Layton, 192 So. 330, 332-33 (Fla. 1939).
71. Id.
72. See Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868, 870-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a defendant's prior litigation was not a bar to his ability to contest
personal jurisdiction in a separate suit); Beach Park Dev. Corp. v. Remhof, 673 So. 2d
912, 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Edwards v. Johnson, 569 So. 2d 473, 473-
74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Burden v. Dickman, 547 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Kom, 400 So. 2d 110, 111
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (same). Although these Florida courts were interpreting
the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution as opposed to the U.S.
Constitution, the clauses are nearly identical. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1
("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ."), with FI.A. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. . . .").
73. Wallace v. Int'l Lifestyles, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-1468, 2008 WL 623811, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2008).
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reasoned, did not mean that the person was automatically subject to
personal jurisdiction in subsequent, unrelated suits.14
Overall, a plaintiff can be said to submit to personal jurisdiction for
unrelated counterclaims because of presence, implied consent,
purposeful availment, or fairness. The next Part discusses why each
of these theories fail.
II. ANALYSIS
Imagine a scenario in which a woman from New York named Pam
takes a road trip. Beginning in New York City, Pam drives her own
car across the country to see Seattle and the great Pacific Northwest.
From there, she plans to take scenic Highway 101 down the coast,
through Oregon and California, ending in sunny San Diego. As Pam
drives through San Francisco, she gets into a car accident with a
California driver. The accident is clearly the California driver's fault.
As the drivers get out of their cars, they realize that they know each
other; the California driver is Dwight, a man who spends a few
weekends every summer in upstate New York in Pam's hometown.
Quite coincidentally, a few years ago, Dwight purchased a house next
to Pam's, making them neighbors for roughly three months of the
year. Pam recently built a brand new deck off the back of her house,
and a surveyor hired by Dwight informed him that the deck
encroaches onto his property by roughly three inches.
After the accident, Pam opts to sue Dwight for the damage to her
car. Because the collision happened in California, Pam decides to
sue there, hires an attorney in San Francisco to handle the case, and
flies home. When Dwight receives notice of the suit, he is furious.
Dwight decides that if Pam is going to sue him, he is going to sue her,
too. With his answer to Pam's claim, he asserts a counterclaim
seeking an equitable remedy for the continuing trespass of Pam's
deck onto his property in New York. Relying on the Supreme Court's
rationale in Saenger and the reasoning from several other lower
courts, his basis for personal jurisdiction over Pam is that she has
voluntarily initiated litigation in California and has, therefore,
submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction for all issues for which
justice to Dwight requires her presence. Thus, Pam is not given
occasion to contest personal jurisdiction over that claim because,
74. Id.; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (explaining that
an unrelated and temporary visit to California many years before could not form the
basis for California's jurisdiction).
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according to the court, she has already constructively submitted to
jurisdiction in California by commencing her action against Dwight there.
This hypothetical scenario requires a multi-part analysis to
determine whether California's exercise of jurisdiction is likely to be
appropriate. Pam unquestionably has a legitimate jurisdictional basis
to sue Dwight in California: Dwight has established his domicile in
California, so he can be sued there for any cause of action;" and Pam
did not have an alternate forum in which she could assert her claim.7
Pursuant to California procedural rules, Dwight can assert an
unrelated counterclaim with his answer to Pam's suit." Pam engaged
in purposeful activity in California both by driving within the state
and initiating a lawsuit related to that activity.
While these propositions seem relatively straightforward, others
that follow from their logical extension are not so intuitive. Pam
exercised her right to recover in the only forum in which she was
able, subjecting her to any claims Dwight had against her. If Dwight's
cause of action would otherwise only be valid against Pam in New
York, the claim is suddenly given life in California purely because
Pam took a trip there and initiated a suit solely related to that trip.
Along the same lines, even if Pam had a choice of forum-perhaps
instead of Dwight the individual, the defendant is a company that
Pam sues in its place of incorporation or principal place of business-
none are palatable choices because they might not be places she
would otherwise go. The illusion of choice does not seem to matter.
Two final questions are appropriate. The first is whether the car
accident and Pam's deck, barring the parties involved, have anything
to do with one another. The answer is, quite obviously, "no." The
second and ultimate question is whether it is actually reasonable to say
that Pam constructively submitted to defend an unrelated suit by bringing
her own action. If not, then there must be another legal basis for
jurisdiction-fairness, presence, purposeful availment, or something else.
Since Saenger, courts commonly acknowledge that a plaintiff
submits himself to the court's jurisdiction with respect to compulsory
75. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
76. Pam cannot sue Dwight in New York because the state's long-arm statute
would not bring Dwight within its courts' jurisdiction for such an accident occurring
in California. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (4) (McKinney Supp. 2015) (allowing for
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who "owns, uses or possesses any real property
situated within the state" but only if the cause of action arises from that ownership,
use, or possession).
77. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 428.10(a) (West Supp. 2015).
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counterclaims,18 claims that relate to the original lawsuit, and it seems
fair to do so under the rationale articulated in International Shoe. But
few courts have confronted the unique dilemma of a plaintiff who
wishes to contest jurisdiction regarding an unrelated counterclaim
brought against him. Given that the Supreme Court has consistently
subscribed to the longstanding principles of fair play and substantial
justice, a plaintiff availing himself of a forum's judicial system for one
issue arguably cannot be said to submit himself to that court's
jurisdiction for any and all claims that may be brought against him.
The Supreme Court's stance on personal jurisdiction seems to be
continually evolving. Yet some principles are repeatedly cited as
crucial to the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
expounded in International Shoe." These principles include
minimum contacts, the nexus requirement, and foreseeability.o
Given the cost and relative inconvenience of litigation, the Court also
generally has an eye toward judicial economy.8' Because none of
these concepts have been directly applied to unrelated counterclaims
in the context of contesting personal jurisdiction, however, it is worth
examining each concept to synthesize a view that comports with the
fairness and justice required by the Due Process Clause.
78. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C.
L. REv. 529, 542 & n.75 (1991) (citing Saenger as the authority from which this view is
derived); Ernest L. Folk, III & Peter F. Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A
Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 791 n.243 (1973) (interpreting Adam v.
Saenger to apply to unrelated counterclaims); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of
"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal jurisdiction,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 726 & n.148 (1983) (construing the Court's apparent
approval of Saenger in Insurance Corp. of Ireland as an indication that a finding of a
plaintiff's forum contacts is not required for counterclaims).
79. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Millikenv. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
80. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97
(1980) (concluding that the foreseeability relevant to due process is "that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 212 (1977) (concluding that jurisdiction based on unrelated property in a state
was unconstitutional because there was not a sufficient nexus between the contact
and the claim).
81. See Asahi Metals Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(finding that the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient results
must be considered when determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction).
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A. Application of Modern Minimum Contacts and Fair Play Rationales to
Unrelated Counterclaims
One of the most basic fairness principles the Court has enunciated
is the requirement that there must be a nexus or connection between
a defendant's presence in a forum and the cause of action for which
he is being sued. Accordingly, if a plaintiffs presence through his
litigation factors into a minimum contacts analysis, that presence
must be related to the cause of action for which a defendant wishes to
bring a counterclaim. In International Shoe, the defendant company
employed between eleven and thirteen salesmen who resided in
Washington." Although the company was incorporated in Delaware,
had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and kept no
stock of its merchandise in Washington, the company still conducted
substantial business in Washington with yearly commissions
exceeding $31,000."3 Moreover, the salesmen rented either
permanent or temporary display rooms to showcase products, and
the company covered the costs.84
With these activities in mind, the Court explained four general
rules with respect to the activities of a potential defendant. First,
where the defendant's presence "ha[s] not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give [s] rise to the liabilities sued on," even though
the defendant did not explicitly consent to suit, courts will almost
always have personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Second, and
contrarily, a defendant's "casual presence," which means either a
single and isolated activity or possibly a series of isolated activities, is
"not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected
with the activities there."8 Third, general jurisdiction-subjecting a
defendant to suits unrelated to its presence in a forum-may be
appropriate if the defendant's actions are so extensive and substantial
such that the suit is justified.8 ' Fourth and finally, depending on the
82. Int' Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 314.
85. Id. at 317.
86. Id. (reasoning that requiring a defendant to defend itself "away from its
home" violates due process by imposing "too great and unreasonable a burden").
87. Id. at 318; see also Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917-18 (N.Y.
1917) (holding that the defendant corporation's business in the state, involving eight
salesmen and other employees at an office in New York whose work resulted in
regular and systematic shipments from Pennsylvania to New York, subjected it to
jurisdiction in New York).
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"nature and quality" of a defendant's activities, it may be fair to imply
a defendant's consent or submission to suit.8 8
Tension exists between the second and fourth rules. The Court
has not specifically decided whether, in light of a plaintiffs
affirmative litigation, it is fair and reasonable to think that her
decision to file suit on one matter opens her up to counterclaims by
the defendant on unrelated matters; or rather, whether it is simply
casual activity that must bear a relationship to the new claims.
However, given the Court's focus on the nexus requirement in cases
after International Shoe, it is more equitable to automatically confer
jurisdiction only for related counterclaims. In Shaffer, the Court
discussed whether owning property in a state was a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction for unrelated claims and concluded that it was not." In
deciding which standard to apply to jurisdictional questions, the
Court held that given the ease with which it could apply the
International Shoe fairness test in most cases, it would be too costly and
could violate due process to simplify litigation by avoiding the
minimum contacts question." Thus, the Court affirmed that the
minimum contacts fairness test applied in every situation: due
process requires a defendant to have contacts with the state and a
nexus between those contacts and the plaintiffs cause of action."
More recent cases similarly suggest that a nexus between claim and
presence should always be required for unrelated litigation. A
unanimous Court in Walden v. Fiore stressed that a defendant's
relationship with a plaintiff alone cannot be the basis for
jurisdiction"; therefore, a Nevada court's exercise ofjurisdiction over
a defendant was inappropriate because his conduct occurred entirely in
Georgia and merely affected the plaintiffs in Nevada." With respect to
the parties, the Court reasoned that their "relationships with each other
may be significant in evaluating their ties to the forum. The
requirements of International Shoe, however, must be met as to each
defendant over whom a state or federal court exercisesjurisdiction."94
88. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318; see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356
(1927) (out-of-state drivers); Lafeyette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (18 How.
1855) (nonresidents with property insurance).
89. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
90. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
91. See id. at 212 (concluding that transient jurisdiction based on unrelated
property in a state was unconstitutional).
92. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).
93. Id. at 1124.
94. Id. at 1123 (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)).
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The instances in which a plaintiff actually has valid minimum
contact grounds for contesting an unrelated counterclaim-and also
wishes to contest jurisdiction based on the lack of minimum
contacts-are few and far between. Despite this scenario's rarity,
courts have expressly identified the issue in a few cases.
A New York appellate division court, though declining to decide
the issue apart from the holding, recognized in dicta that New York's
liberal counterclaim rule comported with a broad reading of
Saenger." In New York, a nonresident who commences an action
automatically designates his attorney as an agent for service of
summons in any separate action, as long as that action could have
been brought as a counterclaim against him." The court dismissed
the defendant's counterclaim because the action was commenced in
federal court, which New York Civil Procedure Law section 303 does
not address, but acknowledged that the constitutional issue remained
open." A similar ruling occurred in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, where a district judge broadly
pronounced section 303 as allowing personal jurisdiction over any
cause of action, so long as it could have been brought as a
counterclaim." These two decisions seem to indicate that, at least in
New York courts, a plaintiff is automatically subject to jurisdiction if a
defendant decides to bring any counterclaim.
Before Saengerwas decided, the Second Circuit also had occasion to
consider the fairness of subjecting a plaintiff to unrelated
countersuits. Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Learned Hand
reasoned that a defendant had an interest in consolidating litigation
in one forum so that he did not have to seek out the plaintiff in a
separate forum away from his home." The opinion further
explained that a plaintiff probably knows about other unresolved
disputes between him and the defendant, so by attacking the
95. Rockwood Nat'1 Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 406 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107
(App. Div. 1978).
96. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 303 (McKinney Supp. 2015); Rockwood Nat' Corp., 406
N.Y.S.2d at 106.
97. Rockwood Nat'l Corp., 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
98. Evergreen Sys., Inc. v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.
1988). The case was dismissed because the original action was brought pursuant to
an arbitration agreement; section 303 did not apply because the arbitration
agreement did not authorize counterclaims, so a separate action could not have been
brought as a counterclaim. Id.
99. See Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman, Inc., 75 F.2d 472, 472 (2d Cir.
1935), af'd sub nom. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935)
(describing the initial forum as one where the suit has necessarily been brought).
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defendant, the plaintiff could foresee-and therefore assumes the
risk of-facing a counterclaim in that same forum." Like Saenger,
this opinion was issued before International Shoe, so the same fairness
analysis was not applied.
On the other hand, Florida state courts have consistently
interpreted fairness from the state constitution's due process clause
to contradict an all-encompassing submission reading of Saenger. While
the last Florida Supreme Court decision on this issue explicitly reasoned
that personal jurisdiction can only be exercised over a plaintiff with
respect to the subject matter of the original claim,101 it did not have
occasion to extend that reasoning and consider unconnected
counterclaims. Although this case was decided before International Shoe
and Shaffer, the fairness logic is consistent with those cases.
In 1990, a Florida district court of appeal unequivocally
pronounced that unless a statute authorized personal jurisdiction
over specific counterclaims-generally compulsory claims-personal
jurisdiction must still be established:
Under the foregoing authorities, [the plaintiff] did not thereby
automatically waive any objections to personal jurisdiction he
might have as to matters raised in a permissive counterclaim.
While he could have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court by responding to the merits of [the defendant's]
counterclaim, he clearly did not do so. It therefore became [the
defendant's] burden to show that personal jurisdiction could be
obtained under [the applicable Florida statute] . . . .102
This reasoning provided the groundwork for later cases. In Beach
Park Development Corp. v. Remhof'0 for example, the court found that
even though "the subject matter [was] clearly one within the
jurisdiction of the court," the court was still required to analyze
personal jurisdiction with respect to what it determined was an
unrelated permissive counterclaim.'0 4  The same court held in
another case that a "current defendant's prior decision to bring a suit
in Florida should not act indefinitely as a sword of Damocles hanging
perilously over the head of that defendant if she later challenges
100. Id. at 472-73.
101. Glass v. Layton, 192 So. 330, 332 (Fla. 1939).
102. Edwards v.Johnson, 569 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
103. 673 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Id. at 914. In fact, the plaintiff Remhof was actually a resident of Florida, so
even if he had contested personal jurisdiction, he would have lost. See id.
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jurisdiction in a separate suit."'' A Pennsylvania district court,
following these Florida cases, held that even if the second suit arose
from the same subject matter as the first, a plaintiff would not
automatically waive the right to contest personal jurisdiction."o'
These cases all embody the fairness logic explicated in International
Shoe and its progeny, which requires a nexus or close connection
between a defendant's presence and the plaintiff's cause of action.
A plaintiff like Pam, who faces an unrelated counterclaim in a
forum away from home, falls either into the second or fourth
category of International Shoe litigants. Under the second rule, casual
contact that is unrelated to the cause of action is not enough to
establish personal jurisdiction."o' As opposed to Pam's casual contact
with California that brought rise to her lawsuit against Dwight, the
defendant in International Shoe engaged in extensive business activity
that directly gave rise to a lawsuit involving state-related taxation
questions. Dwight's lawsuit, on the other hand, had nothing to do
with Pam's casual contacts in California; a court's jurisdiction could
only be premised on her unrelated litigation with Dwight on the
theory that she submitted to it by bringing her initial claim.
There can be no doubt that Pam voluntarily brought her lawsuit in
California. She alone invoked the jurisdiction of the court, affirming
that it was her own affiliation with the state that created her contacts.
To some, this might indicate that because she purposefully brought a
case in the forum, it would be fair for Dwight to force her to defend
an unrelated action in the same forum. Nonetheless, because a
claim, and correspondingly an unrelated counterclaim, must actually
arise from Pam's contacts, there is no nexus between her contacts
and Dwight's encroachment action; therefore, it is constitutionally
unfair."'o In plain terms, there is no connection between Pam suing
105. See Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868, 870-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that by itself, filing a suit two years prior to the action in question would not
satisfy any jurisdictional bases allowed in the relevant state statute because a single
suit did not constitute "substantial activity," especially given the length of time
between suits and the fact that the defendant was not a party in the prior case).
106. Wallace v. Int'l Lifestyles, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-1468, 2008 WL 623811, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2008).
107. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
108. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (emphasizing that a
"defendant's relationship with a plaintiff[,] ... standing alone, is an insufficient basis
for [personal] jurisdiction"); see also Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059,
1061 (3d Cir. 1978) (adopting a logical relation test similar to Florida's); Whigum v.
Heilig-Meyers Furniture Inc., 682 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that in Florida, there must be a logical relationship between the claim
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for the car accident in California and Dwight is suing for a
continuing trespass in New York, so it would be unfair to subject Pam
to a suit in California that has nothing to do with California.'o
Consequently, Pam's chance lawsuit in California would be an
inappropriate basis upon which a California court could exercise
personal jurisdiction.
This interpretation is wholly consistent with the nexus requirement
established in International Shoe and continued by Shaffer.' If the
plaintiffs initial litigation did relate to the defendant's counterclaim,
the action would almost certainly proceed without a personal
jurisdiction question."' Personal jurisdiction over compulsory or
related claims is generally implied because if the claim arises from
the same transaction or occurrence of the original suit, a finding of
minimum contacts would likely be redundant."2 But, given that the
and the counterclaim for the counterclaim to be considered compulsory and
therefore related, and that what was fairly deemed an unrelated permissive claim could
be safely severed from the original suit due to a lack of that logical relationship).
109. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 ("Due process requires that a defendant be
haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not
based on the 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated' contacts he makes by interacting
with other persons affiliated with the State." (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207,
212 (1977) (concluding that every assertion of jurisdiction must be consistent with
the minimum contacts standard).
110. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasizing that
obligations that arise from activities in a state must be connected to those activities).
111. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (authorizing personal
jurisdiction over counterclaims related to the cause of action). For another example
of implied consent to countersuits based on a plaintiffs actions, see Nat'l City Bank
of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 364 (1955), holding that bringing
suit to recover constitutes a waiver to sovereign immunity from a counterclaim. But
see id. at 369-71 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that only an act of Congress
restricting China's sovereign immunity could subject China to direct lawsuits, and
that allowing these suits to be brought in the absence of such a statute overruns the
bounds of a U.S. court'sjurisdiction).
112. See Arch Aluminum & Glass Co. v. Haney, 964 So. 2d 228, 236 (Fl. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (recognizing that the rule automatically conferring jurisdiction in Florida
over compulsory counterclaims promotes judicial economy). But see Hillis v.
Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010) (deciding that a defendant does not
waive any of the Rule 12(b) affirmative defenses by filing any type of counterclaim
and that such a view is increasingly common); Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank
Car Co., 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1967) (concluding that because a defendant has
no choice but to bring his compulsory claims or risk losing them, his assertion of
those claims does not waive hisjurisdictional defenses); Nelson v. World Wide Lease,
Inc., 716 P.2d 513, 516 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (noting that "[t]he preferred rule is
that a compulsory counterclaim does not waive jurisdictional defenses"). In Nelson,
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Court adopted a nexus requirement even with respect to unrelated
property in Shaffer, the same requirement should be extended to
unrelated litigation.
A plaintiff facing a permissive counterclaim and a defendant are
similarly situated, so it is logical and fair to treat them similarly for
purposes of contesting personal jurisdiction. The Court's decision in
Walden supports this deduction and shows why unconnected actions
should be subject to a minimum contacts analysis.'13 When a plaintiff
becomes a defendant by facing a counterclaim, he should be subject
to the rule that, without more, the relationship between the parties
cannot be the basis for jurisdiction. Simply because Pam had some
conduct in California by way of a lawsuit does not mean she should
be treated differently than an ordinary defendant. Under the
International Shoe framework, she would still be within the second rule
concerning casual and non-systematic contacts.
A defendant bringing an unrelated counterclaim could
theoretically bring it at a later time in any forum in which he is able.
The plaintiff, now a defendant in the separate suit, would clearly have
the right to contest personal jurisdiction. Therefore, he should have
that right no matter when or where the counterclaim is brought, so
long as the new claim can be conceptually severed from the original
claim."' Moreover, a defendant generally maintains the right to
contest personal jurisdiction even when he answers with a permissive
counterclaim."' If the defendant wins on his motion to contest
the court reasoned that World Wide Lease, a Washington company authorized to do
business in Idaho, brought a compulsory counterclaim because a portion of plaintiff
Nelson's complaint referred to their lease agreement; thus, the claim arose from the
same transaction or occurrence as the original claim. Id. However, World Wide
Lease fell under the state's long-arm statute because it actually conducted business in
Idaho and had appointed a resident agent who was later served with process, which
was enough for the court to establish jurisdiction. Id.
113. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (holding that a defendant should only be haled
into court based on his affiliation with the state).
114. See Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A
Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why
Transient Presence jurisdiction Is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce
Jurisdiction in a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 524 n.102 (1991)
(beginning with the premise that establishing personal jurisdiction solely by one's
presence in a forum, or transient jurisdiction, is unconstitutional, and concluding by
extension that a plaintiffs presence in a forum that is unrelated to a counterclaim is
similarly unconstitutional).
115. See Rates Tech. Inc. v. Nortel Networks Corp., 399 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (reasoning that a contrary ruling "would effectively eliminate the
unqualified right provided by Rule 12(b) of raising jurisdictional defenses either by
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personal jurisdiction, the unrelated claim would stand alone, making
him the sole plaintiff.'1 6  If he can bring suit in one instance and
contest jurisdiction in another, why should courts decline to afford
an original plaintiff the same right?
On the other hand, if a plaintiff fits into International Shoe's fourth
category, a court would have to find that the nature and quality of his
litigation-and litigation in general-made it so a plaintiff impliedly
submitted to defending any unrelated countersuit brought by the
defendant. An original plaintiffs litigation should not constitute this
submission, nor should it factor into a minimum contacts analysis. A
plaintiff who conducts activities in a state certainly enjoys the
"benefits and protection of the laws of that state,"117 which includes a
right to use that state's court system to protect his own rights
pursuant to those activities."' It follows that access to those benefits
may create certain obligations arising from his activities.'
Extending the submission rationale in Saenger to apply to the fairness
test in International Shoe, by "voluntarily recogniz [ing] the legitimacy
of a state's judicial mechanism" by filing a suit, it might be argued that a
plaintiff should not later be allowed to skirt the obligations that come
with his recognition of that legitimacy120 ; namely, he should be
compelled to defend all lawsuits filed against him within that forum.'
However, participation in litigation is a unique activity and is
different in kind than business operations or physical presence.2 2
motion or answer"); Bayou Steel Corp. v. M/V Amstelvoorn, 809 F.2d 1147, 1149
(5th Cir. 1987) (adopting the "prevailing view" that filing a counterclaim constitutes
a waiver of personal jurisdiction); see also Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 428 (3d
Cir. 1971) (noting that if the court were to hold that a defendant waives his right to
contest jurisdiction by presenting an affirmative claim for relief, it would be
impermissibly "engrafting ajudicial exception to Rule 12(b)").
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(i) (allowing a court to rule on a counter claim "even if the
opposing party's claims have been dismissed .... ).
117. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
118. See id. at 319-20 (characterizing the defendant's large volume of interstate
business as "systematic and continuous," thereby entitling it to benefits including
using the state's court system).
119. Id. at 319.
120. Collins Perdue, supra note 78, at 542-43.
121. See id. (analyzing the question in terms of all other claims-brought by
anyone-as opposed to only compulsory or permissive claims brought by the same
party in the initial suit).
122. See, e.g., Diamond v. Earle, 105 N.E. 363, 363 (Mass. 1914) (explaining that
the rule exempting nonresident witnesses from being served with process exists to
protect the witnesses from "unreasonable obstacles ... thrown in the way of their
freely coming into court to give oral testimony").
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The Supreme Court has made this abundantly clear with respect to
nonresident litigants and witnesses who visit other states to
participate in lawsuits:
The general rule that witnesses, suitors, and their attorneys, while
in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit are
immune from service of process in another, is founded, not upon
the convenience of the individuals, but of the court itself.. .. As
commonly stated and applied, it proceeds upon the ground that
the due administration of justice requires that a court shall not
permit interference with the progress of a cause pending before it,
by the service of process in other suits, which would prevent, or the
fear of which might tend to discourage, the voluntary attendance of
those whose presence is necessary or convenient to the judicial
administration in the pending litigation. 12
While the rule with respect to witnesses is undisputed,1 2 1 there is
considerable disagreement about whether a nonresident plaintiff is
similarly immune to service of process that would otherwise be the
basis for personal jurisdiction.12 1 Some courts have held that a
plaintiff may only be served for issues relating to the matter that he is
already litigating-in essence, compulsory claims.121 Other courts
have gone as far as holding that a plaintiff never has immunity from suits
in which the counterclaimant is a party in his initial action,12 ' but this view
does not seem to have been followed by any courts in recent years.
For the purposes of physical presence jurisdiction, even if business
operations were held to be in the same category as litigation, they
123. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932) (citations omitted) (adding that
the privilege "should be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities require").
124. Recent Cases, Constitutional Law--Due Process of Law-Constitutionality of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act in Its Application to Youthful Criminal Offenders, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 482, 488 n.3 (1959); see Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916) (affirming
that witnesses are exempt from receiving a summons while attending a trial to
encourage voluntary participation in the administration ofjustice).
125. See Rizo v. Burruel, 202 P. 234, 236-37 (Ariz. 1921) (declining to rule on the
issue but providing an overview of competing viewpoints).
126. See Livengood v. Ball, 162 P. 768, 770 (Okla. 1916) (holding that nonresident
plaintiffs who voluntarily commenced an action were not immune from service by
the defendants in a matter related to the subject of their own litigation); see also
Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 129 P. 313, 313-14 (Nev. 1913) (holding that a father
who had been denied custody of his child could not claim immunity from his wife's
divorce suit seeking to gain full custody of their child).
127. See, e.g., Guynn v. McDaneld, 43 P. 74, 74-75 (Idaho 1895) (ruling that a
nonresident who brought suit against a resident of Idaho was not immune from
service of a summons by that Idaho resident in district court because "[i] f the courts
of Idaho [could], in the opinion of a litigant, protect his rights in one case, it would
seem that they ought to be equally adequate in another").
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should still be treated the same. The courts in California have
personal jurisdiction over Pam for related counterclaims because
there is a nexus between her suit and potential related counterclaims.
Likewise, anyone conducting business in California would be subject
to suit for any claim related to that activity, but not for claims
regarding unrelated activity. The plaintiff is only present for the
purposes of the lawsuit, and an unrelated counterclaim does not
concern that presence. Once the lawsuit is over, the plaintiff would
leave the forum and sever his contacts. But for the suit, the plaintiff
would have no reason to be in the state. Justice Scalia's reasoning in
Burnham allows for the possibility that personal jurisdiction for
unrelated counterclaims could be another exception to physical
presence jurisdiction.'2 ' An individual who appears in a forum only
to defend himself cannot be served for an unconnected claim, 29 So it
follows that it would be fair to treat a plaintiff similarly for subsequent
unconnected counterclaims.' IffJustice Scalia did not allow for the
exception, he would likely hold that physical presence, even for a
single lawsuit, is enough contact to allow a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a plaintiff'"' In his view, because traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice include physical presence, it is
conceivable that the implied consent from Hess for the purposes of
motor vehicles could be analogized to the voluntary use of a state's
court system and initiating litigation if it were authorized by statute.'12
Justice Brennan's approach in Burnham is more consistent with
128. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 613 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(listing the exceptions to physical presence jurisdiction); id. at 618-19 (relying on
Pennoyer v. Neff to justify the long-standing tradition of jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone). In this context, physical presence jurisdiction-referred to as
"transient jurisdiction" by some legal commentators andJustices alike-means that a
defendant automatically submits to personal jurisdiction when he is served with
process in the plaintiffs desired forum.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 9 (AM. LAw INST. 1982).
130. See Cox, supra note 114, at 524 n.102, 552 (arguing that allowing a plaintiff to
sue for one cause of action but to contest jurisdiction for a different cause of action
does not necessarily constitute improper "asymmetry" because nonresident litigants
can only use a state's court system for appropriate actions).
131. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610-11 (determining that the early view that a
nonresident's presence in a state is a legitimate basis for personal jurisdiction was
firmly established and still valid, "no matter how fleeting [the defendant's] visit").
132. But see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927) (maintaining that a
nonresident's simple transaction of business in a state "does not imply [his] consent
to be bound by the process of its courts"). Again, because Burnham contradicts the
modern fairness conception, the difference between presence, voluntary affiliation,
and implied consent is not entirely clear.
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fairness, especially when considering the nexus requirement
discussed above.'"' If a court evaluated a defendant's physical
presence with respect to the fairness of imposing a suit based on that
presence, the same evaluation would apply to a plaintiff facing an
unrelated action.'3 4
B. Foreseeability, Efficiency, and Fairness
Foreseeability, in the context of one isolated instance of litigation
that did not arise as a result of the plaintiffs original claim, cannot be
the basis of personal jurisdiction because foreseeability alone is an
insufficient basis upon which to establish jurisdiction. Yet Judge
Learned Hand asserted that the foreseeability of pending disputes
between parties, in conjunction with the desirability of solving those
disputes in one forum, can justify imposing unrelated countersuits on
original plaintiffs." Regardless of the forum in which a plaintiff
brings a claim, a plaintiff can clearly foresee that a defendant might
bring an unrelated claim against him. However, the limitation of that
foresight is circumscribed by jurisdictional considerations. Thus,
despite the seemingly broad scope of unrelated counterclaims, given
jurisdictional constraints, it is unlikely that a plaintiff could or would be
expected to foresee having to defend a lawsuit in a forum with which he
has no connections other than his own unrelated litigation.3 '
Moreover, other disputes between the parties may arise during the
course of litigation that were unforeseen, so the plaintiff would be
subject to jurisdiction away from home simply because he sued first.
From the hypothetical, Dwight is immediately granted the
convenience of both defending and attacking in his home state
133. See supra Part II (discussing the nexus requirement between the plaintiffs
complaint and the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum).
134. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Unlike Justice Scalia, I
would undertake an 'independent inquiry into the ... fairness of the prevailing in-
state service rule."' (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 621 (1884))).
135. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman, Inc., 75 F.2d 472, 472-73 (2d Cir.
1935), affd sub nom. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935).
136. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (elaborating on the
defendant's presence in California and noting that "[t]o hold such temporary visits
to a State a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions
arising in the future" would clearly be unacceptable and undermine prevailing
interpretations of the Due Process Clause); see also Robert Haskell Abrams, Power,
Convenience, and the Elimination of Personaljurisdiction i the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J.
1, 20 (1982) (viewing the Court's decision in Kulko as indicative of the fact that
physical presence in certain cases "may. . . fail to sustain the invocation of in
personam jurisdiction").
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merely because Pam brought her suit in California-the only forum
in which she could bring her claim-before Dwight brought his suit
for encroachment in New York.
Even if the plaintiff may "reasonably anticipate being haled into
court""s' to defend an unrelated counterclaim, that does not
necessarily mean he should forfeit the right to contest jurisdiction-a
right that a defendant being haled would have. If the rule were
otherwise, every lawsuit that a plaintiff initiated would be the basis of
unlimited personal jurisdiction in that forum.' Justice White in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson"' identified two interests that
due process is intended to protect: "It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it
acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system."14 0 As a defendant in a countersuit in
a jurisdiction away from home, Pam certainly seems to be a person
that these dual aims seek to shelter. One response to Pam's situation
might be, "Didn't you read Saenger?" However, there is no reason to
believe that a plaintiff who goes into a jurisdiction out of necessity
would submit to an unrelated suit there, especially when she has no
other ties to that jurisdiction.
The parties' interests in attaining a fair result outweigh the
interstate judicial system's interest in attaining efficiency. The
Court's five fairness factors from Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Courtl 4 1-the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest, he
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining efficient resolutions, and the states' shared
interest in furthering social policies-as applied to permissive
counterclaims indicate that courts must choose an appropriate
balance between the burdens on the parties while giving due
consideration to concerns about judicial economy. The burden on
137. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
138. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994)
("To permit a state to assert jurisdiction over any person in the country whose
product is sold in the state simply because a person must expect that to happen
destroys the notion of individual sovereignties inherent in our system of federalism."); cf
Collins Perdue, supra note 78, at 543-44 (questioning whether voluntarily traveling
through a state should be enough to subject one to suit in that state for any matter, and
concluding that voluntary affiliation is insufficient on its own).
139. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
140. Id. at 291-92.
141. 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality opinion) (outlining the five factors courts
must consider to determine the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction).
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the original plaintiff facing a permissive counterclaim is potentially
quite large. One commentator argued that it would be unfair to
"subject [a plaintiff] to unrelated suits that could trigger choice of
law rules or other litigation realities [he] could not have expected" if
the suit had been brought in a forum with which the plaintiff had
substantial connections."' He may have to hire a new lawyer in that
forum and incur additional travel costs. The interest of the
defendant bringing the unrelated action in obtaining relief, however,
would also be strong because he would be allowed to conveniently
consolidate litigation in the forum of his choice without paying mind
to issues of personal jurisdiction. Similarly, the counterclaiming
defendant's home state may have a strong interest in providing a
resident with a forum to litigate claims, especially when his
adversary-a nonresident-has already invoked the jurisdiction of the
court. But the state's interest likely diminishes if the defendant's
severed counterclaim cannot stand on its own jurisdictional grounds
in the state's courts.
As mentioned above, the pursuit of judicial economy looms on the
other side of the fairness argument. Because one of the Court's
fairness factors is, in fact, "the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,"4 3 it could
be argued that foreseeability, judicial economy, and the fairness to a
defendant in allowing him to sue someone who sues him justifies
imposing a requirement that a plaintiff submit to suits in that forum.
However, this argument overlooks the fifth fairness factor: "the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies."44  A policy that subjects a plaintiff to
jurisdiction for any and all countersuits against him hardly seems like
a policy that the interstate judicial system could consider fair, even in
the name of efficiency.141 It might seem unfair to a defendant to
142. Cox, supra note 114, at 524 n.102.
143. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 115 (considering efficiency against the burden to a
foreign defendant and remarking that the status of the defendant as an alien should
not diminish the importance of the balancing test).
144. Id. at 113.
145. See Attaway v. Omega, 903 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (rationalizing
the lower court's attachment of jurisdiction to a defendant based on the shared
interests of the states). The defendant entered into a contract with an Indiana
resident to purchase a car, had the car driven to Idaho, and then rescinded his
payment. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 9 (AM. LAw INST. 1982)
(explaining that "[a] court may exercise jurisdiction" over a nonresident defendant
for an additional claim only when "the claim involved arose out of the transaction
that is the subject" of the original action or "is one that may in fairness be
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make him go into another forum to bring his permissive
counterclaim, but by the same token, a plaintiff is situated similarly to
a new defendant facing a claim, and the fairness factors are centered
around the contacts of the defendant-he is the one for whom personal
jurisdiction is an issue. 146 Thus, those factors should focus on the
original plaintiff for the purposes of the additional unrelated claim.
C. Practical and Theoretical Problems
The first problem with forcing a plaintiff to submit to personal
jurisdiction each time he files suit in a new forum is that, like Pam, he
may have no other forum in which to litigate his claim.'4 1 It would be
contrary to the interests of truth, justice, and fairness to discourage
lawsuits for fear of being sued for unrelated issues, especially if that
forum is the only one in which a plaintiff can seek the administration
of justice.'48 Moreover, the submission rationale has never been
explicitly applied by a higher federal court to unrelated, permissive
counterclaims, either before or after Saenger. The existing precedent
holds sway only with regard to counterclaims that have a nexus to the
plaintiffs presence, whether relating to the same contract,
transaction, or occurrence in the initial action, or claims that have
been previously authorized under state statutes. One critic has
argued that "consent" is generally a fictional legal concept and can
assume what it sets out to prove,'49 so analyzing fairness is the only
way to keep a state in check when delimiting the territorial
boundaries of its personal jurisdiction reach.
determined concurrently with that action"). Thus, for an unrelated suit, a defendant
is protected from being served with process if he is only physically present for the
purposes of the initial action. Id.
146. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (admitting that in some cases the interests of the plaintiff
and forum state will outweigh the defendant's burden, but then focusing primarily on the
defendant's contacts and his burden in being haled into a foreign jurisdiction).
147. See Arthur John Keeffe & John J. Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality, 32
CORNELL L.Q. 471, 478-79 (1947) (positing that, in general, a plaintiff is acting in his
own interests and not the court's).
148. See, e.g., Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 74 A.2d 142, 143-44 (Pa. 1950)
(recognizing that justice is better served by allowing a defendant to appear in a
forum to defend himself for criminal actions without subjecting him to service of
process for unrelated civil actions).
149. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304-
05 (1989) (posing a hypothetical situation in which England decides to exercise
jurisdiction over anyone who resides in France or owns a French residence and
refuting the notion that even if its jurisdictional reach was expected by the rest of the
world, that would not make it any more legitimate).
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If a court were to hold that personal jurisdiction is automatically
acquired over a plaintiff who brings suit against a defendant for the
purposes of the defendant's permissive counterclaim, it would
essentially create a new form of general jurisdiction between the
parties. This is precisely the situation that the Florida courts
attempted to avoid by adopting a rule allowing original plaintiffs to
contest jurisdiction for unrelated matters."'o The notion that a court
could have plenary power to assert personal jurisdiction over a party
that sued once in that state, and not because the party declared its
domicile, principal place of business, incorporation, or had
substantial systematic and continuous activity there, does not
comport with traditional notions of fairness. If a person or company
litigated in a forum such that it became systematic and continuous, it
may be fair to declare that forum one in which the person or
company was subject to general personal jurisdiction, and therefore,
any suit,"' but even Justice Sotomayor in Bauman probably would not
hold that one or even a few instances of litigation would be grounds
for personal jurisdiction."' Applying the "one case" rule, if a plaintiff had
150. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868, 870-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(per curiam) (rejecting the notion that a court automatically gains jurisdiction over a
defendant when he brings a counterclaim, and requiring the defendant's actions to
meet both Florida's long-arm statute and constitutional due process to permit
personal jurisdiction); Beach Park Dev. Corp. v. Remhof, 673 So. 2d 912, 914 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff was a resident alien of Florida, and
therefore, properly subject to suit in Florida for permissive counterclaims); Edwards
v. Johnson, 569 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (following the rule in
Florida that allows a citizen to raise objections to personal jurisdiction in
counterclaims unrelated to the original suit); Burden v. Dickman, 547 So. 2d 170,
172-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (extending personal jurisdiction to nonresident
plaintiffs because they petitioned the court and thereby "submitted themselves to the
court's jurisdiction" for the suit and subsequent court orders related to the suit);
Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Korn, 400 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(declining to confer automatic personal jurisdiction simply because the plaintiff filed
suit and subjected themselves to the authority of the court and instead remanding
for the trial court to determine jurisdiction consistent with Florida law).
151. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (finding "nothing unpredictable" about a rule in which general
jurisdiction is borne from continuous corporate contacts with a forum).
152. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (highlighting the burden placed on the defendant in having to
litigate or continuously litigate in the forum as a reasonableness factor in permitting
personal jurisdiction). However, in the context of a large business and/or multiple
suits by an individual, repeated and continuous litigation might be enough to
constitute minimum contacts. Big businesses likely would have other contacts in the
forum state, so the litigation would merely factor into the analysis in determining
general jurisdiction and whether the company was at home in that particular forum.
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litigated in a state, a defendant (or anyone) could potentially sue him
there at any time for anything he did anywhere. This is clearly at odds
with the fairness factors required by the Due Process Clause analysis.15 1
As the Saenger Court stated, "there is nothing arbitrary or
unreasonable in treating [the plaintiff] as being there for all
purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence."154
Arguably, because an unrelated counterclaim could theoretically be
severed from the original claim with no consequence, and because a
defendant does not forfeit his right to bring the counterclaim if he
declines to join it with his contemporaneous claims, justice to the
defendant does not necessarily require the plaintiffs presence in that
particular forum. In other words, because there are other, more
appropriate forums in which the parties could litigate the permissive
counterclaim, "the price which the state may exact as the condition of
opening its courts" is too Costly to apply to unrelated claims that
may have nothing to do with that forum. Again, this hinges on the
appropriate balance between fairness and judicial efficiency, but it is
clear that providing a convenient forum for a defendant when it
might not be convenient or fair for a plaintiff-turned-defendant is not
a solution that would meaningfully contribute to solving the problem
of economizing litigation between parties.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, the most equitable approach, and
the approach most consistent with recent personal jurisdiction cases,
is to reject the view that a plaintiff constructively submits to any suit
when he initiates litigation in a particular forum. Instead, a court
should always analyze a plaintiffs connections with the forum, first
with respect to minimum contacts and second with respect to
traditional notions of fairness, to determine whether the court can
exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
The reasons for this treatment are manifold. Because a plaintiff
facing an unrelated counterclaim and a defendant are similarly
situated, it is logical and fair to treat them similarly for purposes of
contesting personal jurisdiction. Further, litigation alone is
153. See id. Here, the burden on the defendant (the plaintiff who is now facing a
permissive counterclaim) is absurdly high. See id. at 114 (stating that the distance the
defendant would have to travel to defend itself, as well as having to navigate a foreign
legal system, taken together were "severe" burdens).
154. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
155. Id. at 68.
672 [Vol. 65:641
IMPERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. If the plaintiffs
instance of litigation is isolated and a defendant brings a claim that is
unrelated to the initial lawsuit, the plaintiffs activity should not
constitute submission to personal jurisdiction, nor should it
automatically imply submission to any future suit. Even though the
plaintiff voluntarily affiliated with a forum and directed purposeful
activity there in commencing an action, the action must be related to
the defendant's counterclaim for the plaintiffs minimum contacts to
satisfy the Supreme Court's fairness tests. Key among the fairness
inquiry is the notion of foreseeability, and while a plaintiff could
foresee that a defendant might bring a permissive action against him,
foreseeability alone is not enough to make it fair for a court to
establish jurisdiction over a plaintiff.
Moreover, concerns of fairness outweigh the interstate judicial
system's interest in efficiency. Although it may be desirable to
consolidate litigation between two parties in one forum, due process
considerations have always controlled and should control in this
instance as well. The Court has consistently adhered to five fairness
factors, and its primary focus is on the burden to the parties and the
interest of the state in resolving controversies. A plaintiff who is
forced to defend an unrelated permissive counterclaim should be
given the most consideration under the fairness factors because it is
likely that his burden will be the highest. Both practical and
theoretical problems suggest that a plaintiff should maintain his right
to contest jurisdiction for permissive counterclaims, given that he
does not have any other ties with the forum state. This view follows
the Supreme Court's trajectory in tending to limit personal
jurisdiction since International Shoe, and it is supported by legal
precedent and logic alike.
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